The Monopolist's Blues
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- G. Marletto, 2007. "Crossing The Alps: Three Transport Policy Options," Working Paper CRENoS 200712, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
- OA Carboni & G. Medda, 2007. "Government Size and the Composition of Public Spending in a Neoclassical Growth Model," Working Paper CRENoS 200701, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
More about this item
Keywordsmarket for lemons; signaling; two-sided asymmetric information; professional bodies; trade unions;
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
- D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-IND-2006-12-09 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-2006-12-09 (Microeconomics)
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