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Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products


  • Bureau, J.-C.
  • Gozlan, E.
  • Marette, S.


Focusing on the issue of food safety, the authors consider a framework of repeated purchases where adverse selection from imperfect information on product quality exists. Countries are characterized by their unequal ability to control quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Bureau, J.-C. & Gozlan, E. & Marette, S., 1999. "Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products," Papers 99-13, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-13

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
    2. Dermot J. Hayes & Jason F. Shogren & Seung Youll Shin & James B. Kliebenstein, 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 77(1), pages 40-53.
    3. Falvey, Rodney E, 1989. "Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 607-622, August.
    4. Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Quality and trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-15, June.
    5. repec:hrv:faseco:30722111 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1993. "Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 199-243, Summer.
    7. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    8. Grossman, Gene M & Shapiro, Carl, 1988. "Counterfeit-Product Trade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 59-75, March.
    9. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    10. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1989. "The role of export subsidies when product quality is unknown," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1-2), pages 69-89, August.
    11. Julie A. Caswell & Neal H. Hooker, 1996. "HACCP as an International Trade Standard," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(3), pages 775-779.
    12. Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1986. "Intra-industry trade and imperfect information about product quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 401-417, April.
    13. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
    14. Copeland, Brian R. & Kotwal, Ashok, 1996. "Product quality and the theory of comparative advantage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1745-1760, December.
    15. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
    16. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    17. Donze, J., 1996. "Refining in Continuous Signaling Games Satisfying the Single-Crossing Condition," Papers 976.422, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    18. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
    19. Donnenfeld, Shabtai & Weber, Shlomo & Ben-Zion, Uri, 1985. "Import controls under imperfect information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 341-354, November.
    20. Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-432, October.
    21. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    22. Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring.
    23. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:gbl:wpaper:2013-01 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Bodo E. Steiner, 2004. "Australian wines in the British wine market: A hedonic price analysis," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 287-307.
    3. Zago, Angelo M. & Pick, Daniel H., 2004. "Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects," Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Western Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 29(01), April.
    4. Fontaine, Damien & Gaspart, Frederic & Frahan, Bruno Henry de, 2008. "Modelling the impact of private quality standards on the fresh fruit and vegetable supply chains in developing countries," 2008 International Congress, August 26-29, 2008, Ghent, Belgium 44378, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Banerjee, Nandini & Kennedy, P. Lynn, 2006. "Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures : A Game Theoretic Approach of Comparative Evaluation," 2006 Annual Meeting, February 5-8, 2006, Orlando, Florida 35375, Southern Agricultural Economics Association.
    6. Steiner, Bodo E., 2002. "The Valuation Of Labelling Attributes In A Wine Market," 2002 Annual meeting, July 28-31, Long Beach, CA 19718, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    7. Bodo Steiner, 2004. "French Wines on the Decline? Econometric Evidence from Britain," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(2), pages 267-288.

    More about this item



    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco


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