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Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products

  • Bureau, J.-C.
  • Gozlan, E.
  • Marette, S.

Focusing on the issue of food safety, the authors consider a framework of repeated purchases where adverse selection from imperfect information on product quality exists. Countries are characterized by their unequal ability to control quality.

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Paper provided by Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor. in its series Papers with number 99-13.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:pnegmi:99-13
Contact details of provider: Postal: THEMA, Universite de Paris X-Nanterre, U.F.R. de science economiques, gestion, mathematiques et informatique, 200, avenue de la Republique 92001 Nanterre CEDEX.

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  1. Murphy, Kevin M. & Shleifer, Andrei, 1997. "Quality and trade," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-15, June.
  2. Gene M. Grossman & Carl Shapiro, 1986. "Counterfeit-Product Trade," NBER Working Papers 1876, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  4. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
  5. Julie A. Caswell & Neal H. Hooker, 1996. "HACCP as an International Trade Standard," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(3), pages 775-779.
  6. Hayes, Dermot J. & Shogren, Jason F. & Shin, Seung Youll & Kliebenstein, James, 1995. "Valuing Food Safety in Experimental Auction Markets," Staff General Research Papers 835, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  7. Bagwell, Kyle & Ramey, Garey, 1993. "Advertising as Information: Matching Products to Buyers," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(2), pages 199-243, Summer.
  8. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1989. "The role of export subsidies when product quality is unknown," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1-2), pages 69-89, August.
  9. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
  10. Copeland, Brian R. & Kotwal, Ashok, 1996. "Product quality and the theory of comparative advantage," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(9), pages 1745-1760, December.
  11. Donnenfeld, Shabtai & Weber, Shlomo & Ben-Zion, Uri, 1985. "Import controls under imperfect information," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 341-354, November.
  12. Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1988. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," Discussion Papers 808, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D and Signaling," Game Theory and Information 9403007, EconWPA, revised 30 Mar 1994.
  14. Donnenfeld, Shabtai, 1986. "Intra-industry trade and imperfect information about product quality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 401-417, April.
  15. Steven Shavell, 1994. "Acquisition and Disclosure of Information Prior to Sale," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 20-36, Spring.
  16. Doughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1997. "Everybody Out of the Pool: Products Liability, Punitive Damages, and Competition," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 410-32, October.
  17. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 896, David K. Levine.
  18. Shapiro, Carl, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(4), pages 659-79, November.
  19. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
  20. Falvey, Rodney E, 1989. "Trade, Quality Reputations and Commercial Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 30(3), pages 607-22, August.
  21. Donze, J., 1996. "Refining in Continuous Signaling Games Satisfying the Single-Crossing Condition," Papers 976.422, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
  22. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
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