Labeling Policies in Food Markets: Private Incentives, Public Intervention, and Welfare Effects
This study considers the welfare impact of labeling policies of agricultural commodities with specific characteristics. Using a model of vertical differentiation, the effects on equilibrium and welfare levels are calculated. The introduction of the regulation and the emergence of two differentiated competitive markets leaves consumers and high-quality producers better off, while low-quality producers are worse off. With high costs and low quality differences, the total welfare impact of the regulation can be negative. Findings show that when high-quality producers can exercise market power, the regulation could be more easily accepted by producers, but it would have a negative effect on consumers.
Volume (Year): 29 (2004)
Issue (Month): 01 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://waeaonline.org/|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- McCluskey, Jill J., 1999.
"A Game Theoretic Approach to Organic Foods: An Analysis of Asymmetric Information and Policy,"
2000 Conference (44th), January 23-25, 2000, Sydney, Australia
123706, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- McCluskey, Jill J., 2000. "A Game Theoretic Approach To Organic Foods: An Analysis Of Asymmetric Information And Policy," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 29(1), April.
- John M. Crespi & St)phan Marette, 2001. "How Should Food Safety Certification be Financed?," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 83(4), pages 852-861.
- Julie A. Caswell & Eliza M. Mojduszka, 1996.
"Using Informational Labeling to Influence the Market for Quality in Food Products,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics,
Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1248-1253.
- Caswell, Julie A. & Mojduszka, Eliza M., 1996. "Using Informational Labeling To Influence The Market For Quality In Food Products," Working Papers 25989, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
- Jean-Christophe Bureau & Estelle Gozlan & StÃ©phan Marette, 2001.
"Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products,"
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications
01-wp283, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- J.-C. Bureau & E. Gozlan & S. Marette, 1999. "Quality signaling and international trade in food products," THEMA Working Papers 99-13, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Bureau, J.-C. & Gozlan, E. & Marette, S., 1999. "Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products," Papers 99-13, Paris X - Nanterre, U.F.R. de Sc. Ec. Gest. Maths Infor..
- Jean-Christophe Bureau & Estelle Gozlan & StÃ©phan Marette, 2001. "Quality Signaling and International Trade in Food Products," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications 01-wp283, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University.
- Giovanni Anania & Rosanna Nisticò, 2004.
"Public Regulation as a Substitute for Trust in Quality Food Markets: What if the Trust Substitute cannot be Fully Trusted?,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE),
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(4), pages 681-681, December.
- Anania, Giovanni & Nistico, Rosanna, 2003. "Public Regulation As A Substitute For Trust In Quality Food Markets. What If The Trust Substitute Cannot Be Fully Trusted?," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa 25924, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Dermot J. Hayes & Sergio H. Lence & Andrea Stoppa, 2004.
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 269-285.
- Hayes, Dermot J. & Lence, Sergio H., 2002. "Farmer-Owned Brands?," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12707, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Hayes, Dermot J. & Lence, Sergio H. & Stoppa, Andrea, 2004. "Farmer-Owned Brands?," Staff General Research Papers Archive 11285, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Dermot J. Hayes & Sergio H. Lence & Andrea Stoppa, 2003. "Farmer-Owned Brands?," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 02-bp39, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
- Ibanez, L., 1999. "Competition in Environmental Labeling," Papers 99.524, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982.
"Reputation and imperfect information,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
- Eliza M. Mojduszka & Julie A. Caswell, 2000. "A Test of Nutritional Quality Signaling in Food Markets Prior to Implementation of Mandatory Labeling," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 82(2), pages 298-309.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Schilizzi, Steven, 2000. "Quality Signaling through Certification," 2000 Conference (44th), January 23-25, 2000, Sydney, Australia 123598, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Damien J. NEVEN & Lars-Hendrik RÖLLER, 1999.
"The Allocation of Jurisdiction in International Antitrust,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
9916, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Neven, Damien J. & Roller, Lars-Hendrik, 2000. "The allocation of jurisdiction in international antitrust," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 845-855, May.
- Jansen, Marion & de Faria, André Lince, 2002. "Product labeling, quality and international trade," WTO Staff Working Papers DERD-2002-01, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
- Marette, Stephan & Crespi, John M & Schiavina, Allesandra, 1999. "The Role of Common Labelling in a Context of Asymmetric Information," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 26(2), pages 167-178, June.
- Maria Luz Loureiro & Jill J. McCluskey, 2000. "Assessing consumer response to protected geographical identification labeling," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(3), pages 309-320.
- Bureau, Jean-Christophe & Marette, Stephan & Schiavina, Alessandra, 1998. "Non-tariff Trade Barriers and Consumers' Information: The Case of the EU-US Trade Dispute over Beef," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 25(4), pages 437-462.
- Giannakas, Konstantinos & Fulton, Murray, 2002. "Consumption effects of genetic modification: what if consumers are right?," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 27(2), pages 97-109, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:jlaare:31143. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.