IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Marchés avec coûts d'information sur la qualité des biens : une application aux produits écolabellisés

  • Douadia Bougherara
  • Virginie Piguet

[eng] Market-failure theory is often used to argue that eco-labeling is a way of increasing market efficiency. We show that, because of additional costs, this may not always be true. We identify three types of information costs regarding quality that may arise with an eco-label. We then measure the market’s ability to provide high-quality goods and buyers’ behavior toward information purchase in laboratory posted-offer markets with varying information costs. We find that markets with information costs are inefficient. For sellers, the probability of offering high-quality goods increases with expected profits but decreases with information costs. For buyers, even low information costs imply a significant surplus loss. We conclude that the function linking information purchase and product price is non-linear and depends on buyers’ beliefs about the relationship between product prices and quality. The design of eco-labels thus plays a crucial role in their success. [fre] La théorie des défaillances de marché est souvent utilisée pour montrer que les labels sur des biens de croyance augmentent l'efficacité des transactions. Or, ils peuvent avoir l’effet inverse en introduisant des coûts supplémentaires. Nous identifions trois sources potentielles de coûts d’information sur la qualité environnementale des biens. Ensuite, nous montrons expérimentalement l’inefficacité des marchés en présence de ces coûts. Pour les vendeurs, la probabilité de proposer de la qualité supérieure augmente avec l’espérance de gain et diminue avec les coûts d’information. Pour les acheteurs, même un coût faible réduit considérablement les surplus. Leur probabilité de demander l’information sur la qualité dépend du prix des unités dans une relation non linéaire, fonction des croyances sur la relation entre prix et qualité. Ainsi, la manière concrète dont l’écolabel est conçu joue un rôle crucial dans son succès.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ecop.2008.7753
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.persee.fr/articleAsPDF/ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7753/ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7753.pdf?mode=light
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 182 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 77-96

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7753
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2008.7753
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ecop

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Cason, T.N. & Gangadharan, L., 1999. "Environmental Labeling and Incomplete Consumer Information in Laboratory Markets," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 708, The University of Melbourne.
  2. McCluskey, Jill J., 2000. "A Game Theoretic Approach To Organic Foods: An Analysis Of Asymmetric Information And Policy," Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 29(1), April.
  3. Gary D. Thompson & Julia Kidwell, 1998. "Explaining the Choice of Organic Produce: Cosmetic Defects, Prices, and Consumer Preferences," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(2), pages 277-287.
  4. Caswell, Julie A. & Mojduszka, Eliza M., 1996. "Using Informational Labeling To Influence The Market For Quality In Food Products," Working Papers 25989, Regional Research Project NE-165 Private Strategies, Public Policies, and Food System Performance.
  5. Douadia Bougherara & Gilles Grolleau, 2004. "L'éco-étiquetage des produits est-il crédible ? Proposition d'un cadre d'analyse," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, vol. 0(3), pages 369-390.
  6. Noussair, Charles & Plott, Charles & Riezman, Raymond., . "An Experimental Investigation of the Patterns of International Trade," Working Papers 799, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  7. Miller, Ross M. & Plott, Charles R., . "Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets," Working Papers 447, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1980. "On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 393-408, June.
  9. Van Zandt, Timothy, 2001. "Information Overload in a Network of Targeted Communication," CEPR Discussion Papers 2836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Loader, Rupert & Hobbs, Jill E., 1999. "Strategic responses to food safety legislation," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 685-706, December.
  12. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
  13. Kihlstrom, Richard, 1974. "A general theory of demand for information about product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(4), pages 413-439, August.
  14. Akerlof, George A, 1970. "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500, August.
  15. Brannon, James I. & Gorman, Michael F., 2002. "The effects of information costs on search and convergence in experimental markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 375-390, April.
  16. Jeffrey R. Blend & Eileen O. van Ravenswaay, 1999. "Measuring Consumer Demand for Ecolabeled Apples," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1072-1077.
  17. Barzel, Yoram, 1982. "Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 27-48, April.
  18. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-29, March-Apr.
  19. Claudia Keser & Marc Willinger, 2000. "La théorie des contrats dans un contexte expérimental : un survol des expériences sur les relations « principal-agent »," Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 237-253.
  20. Wanki Moon & Wojciech J. Florkowski & Bernhard Brückner & Ilona Schonhof, 2002. "Willingness to Pay for Environmental Practices: Implications for Eco-Labeling," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(1), pages 88-102.
  21. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-387775 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Teisl, Mario F. & Roe, Brian & Hicks, Robert L., 2002. "Can Eco-Labels Tune a Market? Evidence from Dolphin-Safe Labeling," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 339-359, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2008_num_182_1_7753. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.