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Agricultural Production Clubs: Viability and Welfare Implications

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  • Langinier, Corinne
  • Babcock, Bruce A.

Abstract

Consumers are in general less informed than producers about the quality of agricultural goods. To reduce he information gap, consumers can rely on standards (e.g., certification) that ensure quality and origin of the goods. These costly standards can be adopted by a group of producers of high-quality goods. We study the formation of such a group that we model as a club. We first investigate under what circumstances a club of a given size is desirable for producers, and for society. We then analyze the optimal size of the club when there exists a direct barrier to entry, and when there is no barrier. We find that for intermediate values of certification costs, the industry and a club of a given size of certified producers have divergent incentives. Furthermore, if barriers to entry are allowed, an optimal size of club exists, which allows some revelation of information. In the absence of barrier to entry, it is less likely that a club will emerge.

Suggested Citation

  • Langinier, Corinne & Babcock, Bruce A., 2006. "Agricultural Production Clubs: Viability and Welfare Implications," Staff General Research Papers Archive 12670, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:isu:genres:12670
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Koen Deconinck & Martijn Huysmans & Jo Swinnen, 2015. "The political economy of geographical indications," Working Papers of LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance 509755, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance.
    2. repec:lic:licosd:37215 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Alexander E. Saak, 2011. "A Model of Labeling with Horizontal Differentiation and Cost Variability," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1131-1150.
    4. Valentina Raimondi & Chiara Falco & Daniele Curzi & Alessandro Olper, 2020. "Trade effects of geographical indication policy: The EU case," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 330-356, June.
    5. Martin Pollrich & Lilo Wagner, "undated". "Informational opacity and honest certication," BDPEMS Working Papers 2013001, Berlin School of Economics.
    6. Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra & Yu, Jianyu, 2011. "Quality Choice, Competition and Vertical Relationship in a Market of Protected Designation of Origin," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114264, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    7. Pecchioli, Bruno & Moroz, David, 2023. "Do geographical appellations provide useful quality signals? The case of Scotch single malt whiskies," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    8. Ngokkuen, Chuthaporn & Grote, Ulrike, 2012. "Geographical Indication for Jasmine Rice: Applying a Logit Model to Predict Adoption Behavior of Thai Farm Households," Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, Humboldt-Universitaat zu Berlin, vol. 51(2), pages 1-29, May.
    9. Bontemps, Christophe & Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra & Simioni, Michel, 2012. "Quality Labels and Firm Survival in the French Cheese Industry," IDEI Working Papers 741, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    10. Tauber, Ramona & Anders, Sven M. & Langinier, Corinne, 2011. "The Economics of Geographical Indications: Welfare Implications," Working Papers 103262, Structure and Performance of Agriculture and Agri-products Industry (SPAA).
    11. Christophe Charlier & Mai-Anh Ngo, 2012. "Geographical indications outside the European Regulation on PGIs, and the rule of the free movement of goods: lessons from cases judged by the Court of Justice of the European Communities," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 17-30, August.
    12. Leufkens, D., 2015. "Der Wert geschützter Herkunftsangaben in einer industrieökonomischen und hedonischen Preisanalyse," Proceedings “Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e.V.”, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA), vol. 50, March.
    13. Stranieri, Stefanella & Orsi, Luigi & De Noni, Ivan & Olper, Alessandro, 2023. "Geographical Indications and Innovation: Evidence from EU regions," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
    14. Daniela Benavente, 2010. "Geographical Indications: The Economics of Claw-Back," IHEID Working Papers 11-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    15. Galli, Francesca & Carbone, Anna & Caswell, Julie A. & Sorrentino, Alessandro, 2011. "A Multi-Criteria Approach to Assessing PDOs/PGIs: An Italian Pilot Study," International Journal on Food System Dynamics, International Center for Management, Communication, and Research, vol. 2(3), pages 1-18, December.
    16. Teuber, Ramona, 2011. "Protecting Geographical Indications: Lessons learned from the Economic Literature," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 116081, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
    17. Leufkens, Daniel, 2014. "Der Wert Geschützter Herkunftsangaben In Einer Industrieökonomischen Und Hedonischen Preisanalyse," 54th Annual Conference, Goettingen, Germany, September 17-19, 2014 187429, German Association of Agricultural Economists (GEWISOLA).
    18. Koen Deconinck & Jo Swinnen, 2021. "The Size of Terroir: A Theoretical Note on Economics and Politics of Geographical Indications," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(1), pages 321-328, February.
    19. Annalisa Zezza & Federica Demaria & Maria Rosaria Pupo d'Andrea & Jo Swinnen & Giulia Meloni & Senne Vandevelde & Alessandro Olper & Daniele Curzi & Valentina Raimondi & Sophie Drogue, 2018. "Research for AGRI Committee - Agricultural trade: assessing reciprocity of standards," Working Papers hal-02787948, HAL.
    20. Daniela Benavente, 2010. "The Economics of Geographical Indications: GIs Modelled As Club Assets," IHEID Working Papers 10-2010, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    21. Armelle Mazé, 2023. "Geographical indications as global knowledge commons: Ostrom's law on common intellectual property and collective action," Post-Print hal-04063797, HAL.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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