Quality Uncertainty with Imperfect Information Acquisition
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
- Kihlstrom, Richard E, 1974. "A Bayesian Model of Demand for Information About Product Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 15(1), pages 99-118, February.
- Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
- Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2009. "Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 335-350, November.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gertz, Christopher, 2016. "A Model of Quality Uncertainty with a Continuum of Quality Levels," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 522, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
More about this item
KeywordsQuality uncertainty; Price signaling; Adverse selection; Information acquisition; Two-sided incomplete information;
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-10-25 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CTA-2013-10-25 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-GTH-2013-10-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2013-10-25 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-10-25 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:487. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bettina Weingarten). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/imbiede.html .