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Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand

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  • Ellingsen, Tore

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  • Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:16:y:1997:i:1:p:43-61
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, December.
    3. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1989. "The role of export subsidies when product quality is unknown," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1-2), pages 69-89, August.
    4. repec:bla:scandj:v:90:y:1988:i:3:p:415-34 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
    6. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1986. "Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 796-821, August.
    7. Kenneth L. Judd & Michael H. Riordan, 1994. "Price and Quality in a New Product Monopoly," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(4), pages 773-789.
    8. Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1993. "Price as a signal of quality : A discussion of equilibrium concepts in signalling games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 483-504, November.
    9. Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W., 1985. "Monopoly provision of product quality with uninformed buyers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 439-449, December.
    10. In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221.
    11. Gene M. Grossman & Henrik Horn, 1988. "Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(4), pages 767-787.
    12. Asher Wolinsky, 1983. "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(4), pages 647-658.
    13. Cho, In-Koo & Sobel, Joel, 1990. "Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 381-413, April.
    14. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    15. Yuk-Shee Chan & Hayne Leland, 1982. "Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(4), pages 499-516.
    16. Bagwell, Kyle, 1991. "Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1156-1169, December.
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