Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand
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- Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1984.
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- Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
- Kenneth L. Judd & Michael H. Riordan, 1994. "Price and Quality in a New Product Monopoly," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(4), pages 773-789.
- Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1988.
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808, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Yuk-Shee Chan & Hayne Leland, 1982. "Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 499-516.
- Asher Wolinsky, 1983. "Prices as Signals of Product Quality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 647-658.
- In-Koo Cho & David M. Kreps, 1997.
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896, David K. Levine.
- Overgaard, Per Baltzer, 1993. "Price as a signal of quality : A discussion of equilibrium concepts in signalling games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 483-504, November.
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