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Monopoly Provision of Product Quality with Uninformed Buyers

Author

Listed:
  • Russell Cooper
  • Thomas W. Ross

    (University of Chicago & Carleton University)

Abstract

This essay is concerned with a monopolist's incentives to provide a high quality goods when some of its customers cannot observe quality prior to purchase. We show that if all buyers have the same tastes for quality, the monopolist will not try to take advantage of the poorly informed. When tastes differ, however, some quality randomization may become profitable as a means to loosen binding self-selection constraints. The profitability of randomization is shown to depend upon the relative degrees of risk aversion of the buyers and on the convexity of the firm's cost of quality function. We view our results as pointing to some potential benefits from imperfect quality control.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1984. "Monopoly Provision of Product Quality with Uninformed Buyers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 688R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Nov 1984.
    • Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:688r
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    File URL: https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d06/d0688-r.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Sanford J, 1981. "The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 461-483, December.
    2. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1984. "Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 197-207.
    3. Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
    4. Nelson, Phillip, 1970. "Information and Consumer Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 311-329, March-Apr.
    5. Yuk-Shee Chan & Hayne Leland, 1982. "Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(4), pages 499-516.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kyle Bagwell & Michael Riordan, 1986. "Equilibrium Price Dynamics for an Experience Good," Discussion Papers 705, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    2. Daughety, Andrew F & Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1995. "Product Safety: Liability, R&D, and Signaling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1187-1206, December.
    3. Bagwell, Kyle & Riordan, Michael H, 1991. "High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 224-239, March.
    4. Bester, Helmut & Ritzberger, Klaus, 2001. "Strategic pricing, signalling, and costly information acquisition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(9), pages 1347-1361, November.
    5. Oren Gazal-Ayal, 2007. "Economic analysis of standard form contracts: the monopoly case," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 119-136, October.
    6. Tirtiroglu, Dogan & Tirtiroglu, Ercan, 2020. "Seller Financing: Contracting Out of the Lemons and Moral Hazard Problems When They May Co-Exist," American Business Review, Pompea College of Business, University of New Haven, vol. 23(2), pages 335-357, November.
    7. Benhabib, Jess & Dong, Feng & Wang, Pengfei, 2018. "Adverse selection and self-fulfilling business cycles," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 114-130.
    8. Thomas Liebi, 2003. "The Demand for Tests," Diskussionsschriften dp0307, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft.
    9. Takaoka, Sumiko, 2005. "The effects of product liability costs on R&D with asymmetric information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 59-81, January.
    10. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
    11. Moraga-Gonzalez, Jose Luis, 2000. "Quality uncertainty and informative advertising," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 615-640, May.
    12. Baomin Dong & Guixia Guo & Frank Yong Wang, 2021. "A signalling model of loss leader pricing strategy," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(2), pages 289-307, June.

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    JEL classification:

    • C22 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions; Dynamic Treatment Effect Models; Diffusion Processes

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