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Seller honesty and product line pricing

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  • Bing Jing

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  • Bing Jing, 2011. "Seller honesty and product line pricing," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 403-427, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:qmktec:v:9:y:2011:i:4:p:403-427
    DOI: 10.1007/s11129-011-9103-6
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    10. Feldman, Roger, 2001. "An Economic Explanation for Fraud and Abuse in Public Medical Care Programs," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(2), pages 569-577, June.
    11. Green, Jerry R. & Stokey, Nancy L., 2007. "A two-person game of information transmission," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 90-104, July.
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    13. Justin P. Johnson & David P. Myatt, 2003. "Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting Brands and Product Line Pruning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 748-774, June.
    14. J. Miguel Villas-Boas, 2004. "Communication Strategies and Product Line Design," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(3), pages 304-316, January.
    15. Bester, Helmut, 1993. "Bargaining versus Price Competition in Markets with Quality Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 278-288, March.
    16. Bing Jing, 2011. "Exogenous Learning, Seller-Induced Learning, and Marketing of Durable Goods," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(10), pages 1788-1801, October.
    17. Dmitri Kuksov, 2004. "Buyer Search Costs and Endogenous Product Design," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(4), pages 490-499, May.
    18. Liang Guo & Ganesh Iyer, 2010. "Information Acquisition and Sharing in a Vertical Relationship," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(3), pages 483-506, 05-06.
    19. Darby, Michael R & Karni, Edi, 1973. "Free Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 67-88, April.
    20. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1984. "Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 197-207.
    21. K. Sridhar Moorthy, 1984. "Market Segmentation, Self-Selection, and Product Line Design," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(4), pages 288-307.
    22. Pitchik, Carolyn & Schotter, Andrew, 1987. "Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 1032-1036, December.
    23. Dina Mayzlin, 2006. "Promotional Chat on the Internet," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(2), pages 155-163, 03-04.
    24. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    25. Yuk-Shee Chan & Hayne Leland, 1982. "Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 49(4), pages 499-516.
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    Cited by:

    1. Iman Ahmadi, 2023. "Face/Off: The adverse effects of increased competition," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 183-279, June.
    2. Baojun Jiang & Jian Ni & Kannan Srinivasan, 2014. "Signaling Through Pricing by Service Providers with Social Preferences," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 33(5), pages 641-654, September.
    3. Xi Li & Zibin Xu, 2022. "Superior Knowledge, Price Discrimination, and Customer Inspection," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 41(6), pages 1097-1117, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Asymmetric information; Pricing; Product line; Recommendation; Upselling; D82; L15; M31;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • M31 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Marketing

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