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La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature

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  • Garcia, René

    (Université de Montréal)

Abstract

This paper attempts to give an integrated view of the numerous contributions to economic theory of information. After an introduction where the economics of information is placed within the context of general economic theory and defined relative to the Arrow-Debreu contingent market model, the paper reviews in three sections, entitled Asymetric information and Market Structure, Information revealed by prices, and Asymetric information and exchange, the core articles and their main results. The paper concludes with the value of information, its characteristics as a good, and the challenge of integrating it into a general equilibrium model. Le présent article fournit un exposé synthétique de la riche littérature sur l’économie de l’information. L’introduction situe la théorie économique de l’information dans la théorie économique générale et la définit par rapport au modèle des marchés contingents de Arrow-Debreu. Trois sections intitulées : Asymétrie d’information et structure des marchés, Transmission d’information par les prix et Information asymétrique et échange, analysent les principaux articles et leurs résultats. En conclusion, on aborde le thème de la valeur de l’information, on présente les caractéristiques de l’information en tant que bien et on souligne le défi que représente son intégration dans un modèle d’équilibre général.

Suggested Citation

  • Garcia, René, 1986. "La théorie économique de l’information : exposé synthétique de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 62(1), pages 88-109, mars.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:62:y:1986:i:1:p:88-109
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