Adverse selection, repeated insurance contracts and announcement strategy
In this note, we present a strategy which relies on multi-period contracts and on a self-selection mechanism which induces the insured to announce his true risk in the first period, thus eliminating inefficiency due to adverse selection.
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|Note:||In : Review of Economic Studies, 52, 719-723, 1985|
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