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Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly

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  • Bagwell, Kyle

Abstract

A new welfare-enhancing role is identified for a policy of export subsidization in a new-product industry. An export-subsidy policy promotes the (rational) perception that a high-quality export can be provided at a relatively low price. Thus, an export subsidy generates a first-order benefit to welfare by enabling a high-quality export to be sold at a less-distorted high price. The subsidy will also introduce distortions into the price of a low-quality export and the quality-selection process. Since these choices are initially undistorted, however, the export-country welfare loss arising from new distortions is of second-order importance. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Bagwell, Kyle, 1991. "Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1156-1169, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:81:y:1991:i:5:p:1156-69
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    Cited by:

    1. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2011. "Competition and the signaling role of prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 412-425, July.
    2. Chisik, Richard, 2003. "Export industry policy and reputational comparative advantage," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 423-451, March.
    3. Mohd Amin, 2004. "Sensitivity of Tariffs and Quotas: A Signaling Game," International Trade 0401003, EconWPA.
    4. C. Simon Fan & Yifan Hu, 2006. "A Signaling Model of Quality and Export: with application to dumping," DEGIT Conference Papers c011_058, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.
    5. Cagé, Julia & Rouzet, Dorothée, 2015. "Improving “national brands”: Reputation for quality and export promotion strategies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(2), pages 274-290.
    6. Young-Han Kim, 1999. "The Welfare Analysis of Trade Policies: The Optimal Government Intervention Timing under Incomplete Information," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 53-70.
    7. Ellingsen, Tore, 1997. "Price signals quality: The case of perfectly inelastic demand," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 43-61, November.
    8. Staiger, Robert W., 1995. "International rules and institutions for trade policy," Handbook of International Economics,in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551 Elsevier.
    9. Desai, Mihir A. & Hines Jr., James R., 2008. "Market reactions to export subsidies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 459-474, March.
    10. Horst Raff & Marc von der Ruhr, 2007. "Foreign Direct Investment in Producer Services: Theory and Empirical Evidence," Applied Economics Quarterly (formerly: Konjunkturpolitik), Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, vol. 53(3), pages 299-321.
    11. Krautheim, Sebastian & Verdier, Thierry, 2016. "Offshoring with endogenous NGO activism," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(C), pages 22-41.
    12. Shin, Inyong & Kim, Hyunho, 2010. "The effect of subsidy policies on the product quality improvement," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 687-696, May.
    13. Dinopoulos, Elias & Livanis, Grigorios & West, Carol, 2010. "Country of Origin Labeling (C.O.O.L.): How cool is it?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 575-589, October.
    14. Katayama, Seiichi & Miyagiwa, Kaz, 2009. "FDI as a signal of quality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 103(3), pages 127-130, June.
    15. Creane, Anthony & Jeitschko, Thomas D., 2016. "Exporting to bypass weak institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 185-197.
    16. Bagwell, Kyle, 1992. "Pricing to Signal Product Line Quality," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 151-174, Spring.
    17. Stephen DeLoach & Jayoti Das, 2008. "Resolving the paradox of social standards and export competitiveness," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(4), pages 467-483.
    18. Casella, Alessandra & Rauch, James E., 2002. "Anonymous market and group ties in international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 19-47, October.
    19. Adriani, Fabrizio & Deidda, Luca G., 2009. "Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 335-350, November.
    20. Stephan, Levy, 2004. "Best-price Guarantees as a Quality Signal," MPRA Paper 13466, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Nov 2004.
    21. F. Adriani & LG Deidda, 2006. "The Monopolist's Blues," Working Paper CRENoS 200611, Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia.
    22. Raff, Horst & Kim, Young-Han, 1999. "Optimal export policy in the presence of informational barriers to entry and imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 99-123, October.
    23. McCalman, Phillip, 2010. "Trade policy in a "super size me" world," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 206-218, July.
    24. Takaoka, Sumiko, 2005. "The effects of product liability costs on R&D with asymmetric information," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 59-81, January.
    25. Dinopoulos, Elias & Livanis, Grigorios T. & West, Carol Taylor, 2005. "How Cool is C.O.O.L.?," Working Papers 15658, University of Florida, International Agricultural Trade and Policy Center.

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