Optimal Export Policy for a New-Product Monopoly
A new welfare-enhancing role is identified for a policy of export subsidization in a new-product industry. An export-subsidy policy promotes the (rational) perception that a high-quality export can be provided at a relatively low price. Thus, an export subsidy generates a first-order benefit to welfare by enabling a high-quality export to be sold at a less-distorted high price. The subsidy will also introduce distortions into the price of a low-quality export and the quality-selection process. Since these choices are initially undistorted, however, the export-country welfare loss arising from new distortions is of second-order importance. Copyright 1991 by American Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 81 (1991)
Issue (Month): 5 (December)
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- Grossman, G.N., 1989. "Promoting New Industrial Activities: A Survey Of Recent Arguments And Evidence," Papers 147, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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