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Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Andrabi, Tahir

    (Pomona College)

  • Das, Jishnu

    (World Bank Development Research Group)

  • Khwaja, Asim Ijaz

    (Harvard University)

Abstract

We study the impact of providing school and child test scores on subsequent test scores, prices, and enrollment in markets with multiple public and private providers. A randomly selected half of our sample villages (markets) received report cards. This increased test scores by 0.11 standard deviations, decreased private school fees by 17 percent and increased primary enrollment by 4.5 percent. Heterogeneity in the treatment impact by initial school quality is consistent with canonical models of asymmetric information. Information provision facilitates better comparisons across providers, improves market efficiency and raises child welfare through higher test scores, higher enrollment and lower fees.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrabi, Tahir & Das, Jishnu & Khwaja, Asim Ijaz, 2014. "Report Cards: The Impact of Providing School and Child Test Scores on Educational Markets," Working Paper Series rwp14-052, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp14-052
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I25 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Education and Economic Development
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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