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A survival analysis of the circulation of the political elites governing Italy from 1861 to 1994

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  • Silvia Fedeli
  • Francesco Forte

Abstract

We study the determinants of governments and legislatures’ survival in Italy from the unification to the end ofthe I Republic (1861-1994) - excluding the fascist period and the subsequent transitory institutional period,""Constituente"" (1946-1948).We test whether institutional features such as electoral systems, form of State and extent of suffrage had anyeffect on the survival of legislatures and governments. We control for voting power of the parliamentarygroups, number of parties represented in the parliament and size of the representative bodies.Unlike the political economy wisdom, we show that, over the whole period, governments and legislatures’survivals are inversely related to the plurality electoral system. The restricted suffrage and a high voting powerof the leading parties reduce the risk of anticipated end of governments.The survival of the legislatures is related to the form of state (republic) and to the voting power of the leadingparty.

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  • Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2011. "A survival analysis of the circulation of the political elites governing Italy from 1861 to 1994," Working Papers in Public Economics 141, University of Rome La Sapienza, Department of Economics and Law.
    • Handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp141
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