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Federal Funding in the South: Bringing Home the Bacon, but Where's the Beef?

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  • Reeder, Richard J.

    (Economic Research Service)

  • Calhoun, Samuel D.

    (Economic Research Service)

Abstract

The South receives more federal funding per capita than other regions, but much of the South's funding advantage comes from the defense and space industries and other functions serving national rather than regional or local objectives. In contrast, most programs designed to achieve regional and local development objectives do not particularly benefit the South, and the non-metro South gets relatively fewer of many of these programs then nonmetro areas nationwide. Metro areas generally receive more federal funds per capita than nonmetro areas, but this metro-nonmetro gap is larger in the South than elsewhere in the country. Another nationwide pattern that is particularly present in the South is that federal spending tends to favor higher-income areas, especially among metro areas. While federal spending may help mitigate growth disparities nationwide, we found no evidence of this in the South.

Suggested Citation

  • Reeder, Richard J. & Calhoun, Samuel D., 2001. "Federal Funding in the South: Bringing Home the Bacon, but Where's the Beef?," The Review of Regional Studies, Southern Regional Science Association, vol. 31(1), pages 1-12, Summer.
    • Handle: RePEc:rre:publsh:v:31:y:2001:i:1:p:1-12
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    Cited by:

    1. Jolliffe, Dean, 2006. "The Cost of Living and the Geographic Distribution of Poverty," Economic Research Report 7254, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.

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