Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislators
Legislators in modern democracies accept bribes that are small compared to the value of the statutes they pass and allow bans against bribery to be enforced. In the authors' model of bribery, rational legislators accept bribes smaller not only than the benefit the briber receives but than the costs the legislators incur in accepting the bribes. Rather than risk this outcome, the legislators may be willing to suppress bribery altogether. The size of legislatures, the quality of voter information, the nature of party organization, and the structure of committees will all influence the frequency and size of bribes. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 78 (1994)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (March)
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