Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games
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- Bishnu, Monisankar & Roy, Sonali, 2009. "Hierarchy of Players in Swap Robust Voting Games," Staff General Research Papers Archive 13118, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Bishnu, Monisankar & Roy, Sonali, 2012. "Hierarchy of players in swap robust voting games," Staff General Research Papers Archive 36387, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
- Taylor Alan & Zwicker William, 1993. "Weighted Voting, Multicameral Representation, and Power," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 170-181, January.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
- Josep Freixas, 2010. "On ordinal equivalence of the Shapley and Banzhaf values for cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(4), pages 513-527, October.
- Werner Kirsch & Jessica Langner, 2010. "Power indices and minimal winning coalitions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 33-46, January.
- Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 2008. "On ordinal equivalence of power measures given by regular semivalues," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 221-234, March.
- Carreras, Francesc & Freixas, Josep, 1996. "Complete simple games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 139-155, October.
- Saari, Donald G. & Sieberg, Katri K., 2001. "Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 241-263, August.
- Lawrence Diffo Lambo & Joël Moulen, 2002. "Ordinal equivalence of power notions in voting games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 313-325, December.
- Josep Freixas & Montserrat Pons, 2010. "Hierarchies achievable in simple games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 68(4), pages 393-404, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Freixas, Josep & Tchantcho, Bertrand & Tedjeugang, Narcisse, 2014. "Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 236(1), pages 254-260.
- repec:spr:annopr:v:244:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s10479-016-2124-5 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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