Some Surprising Properties of Power Indices
No abstract is available for this item.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Iñaki García & Esther Gutiérrez & Emilio Calvo, 1999. "Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 491-512.
- Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "Value Theory without Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 513, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Philip Straffin, 1977. "Homogeneity, independence, and power indices," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 107-118, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:36:y:2001:i:2:p:241-263. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.