Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach
In this work we define the game of the alternatives for each preference profile, and establish relations between scoring rules and cooperative solution concepts for that game, such as the family of semivalues and the family of least square values.
Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 17 March 1997/Accepted: 12 May 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:491-512. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.