Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach
In this work we define the game of the alternatives for each preference profile, and establish relations between scoring rules and cooperative solution concepts for that game, such as the family of semivalues and the family of least square values.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 16 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 17 March 1997/Accepted: 12 May 1998|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/355|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:16:y:1999:i:3:p:491-512. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.