Power indices and minimal winning coalitions
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Volume (Year): 34 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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- Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computation of Power Indices," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 644, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Felsenthal, Dan S & Machover, Moshe, 1998. "The Product Paradox of Voting Power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 81-92, July.
- Annick Laruelle & F. Valenciano, 2005.
"Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations,"
- Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
- Leech, D., 1998. "Computing Power Indices for Large Voting Games: A New Algorithm," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 510, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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