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Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems

Author

Listed:
  • Birkmeier Olga

    (University of Augsburg, Institute for Mathematics, Augsburg, Deutschland)

  • Käufl Andreas

    (University of Augsburg, Institute for Mathematics, Augsburg, Deutschland)

  • Pukelsheim Friedrich

Abstract

Ternary decision rules allowing for abstentions,besides Yea- and Nay-votes, are analyzed. The German Bundesrat serves as a prime example. We show that the decision-making efficiency of the Bundesrat would increase if abstentions were allowed. A general formula for the mean success margin of a ternary decision rule is derived assuming selfdual and permutationally invariant distributions. The ternary Penrose–Banzhaf model is discussed in detail, and the influence probabilities of voters and a rule´s influence sensitivity are evaluated.

Suggested Citation

  • Birkmeier Olga & Käufl Andreas & Pukelsheim Friedrich, 2011. "Abstentions in the German Bundesrat and ternary decision rules in weighted voting systems," Statistics & Risk Modeling, De Gruyter, vol. 28(1), pages 1-16, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:strimo:v:28:y:2011:i:1:p:1-16:n:2
    DOI: 10.1524/stnd.2011.1066
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    References listed on IDEAS

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