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Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency

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  • Matthew Gould

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  • Matthew D. Rablen

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Abstract

Twenty years of negotiations over reform of the United nations Security Council (UNSC) are yet to bear fruit. We use recent advances in the theory of a priori voting power to present a formal quantitative appraisal of the "structural reforms" contained within eleven current reform proposals, and the separate effect of expansion of the UNSC membership. Only two reform proposals, the EU acting as a single entity, or a weakening of the veto power for permanent members, robustly dominate the status quo against our measures of equity and efficency. Several proposals may actually worsen the issues they ostensibly claim to resolve.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2014. "Reform of the United Nations Security Council: Equity and Efficiency," CEDI Discussion Paper Series 14-01, Centre for Economic Development and Institutions(CEDI), Brunel University.
  • Handle: RePEc:edb:cedidp:14-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Gould & Matthew D. Rablen, 2016. "Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 169(1), pages 19-51, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques

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