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The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making

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  • Widgrén, Mika

Abstract

This paper deals with the design of voting rules in the EU Council. Both internal and external impact of the voting rules are examined. Internal impact affects the distribution of power among the member states and external impact affects power relations between the main decision-making bodies in the EU. One of the main lessons of the analysis is that voting rules matter. This clearly explains why the design of Council voting rules has required so much bargaining and cumbersome marathon negotiations. The internal decision-making rules in the Council have substantial impact on both the national distribution of power in the Council and inter-institutional power between the EUŽs decision-making bodies.

Suggested Citation

  • Widgrén, Mika, 2008. "The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making," Discussion Papers 1162, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  • Handle: RePEc:rif:dpaper:1162
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Francesco Passarelli & Jason Barr, 2007. "Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(1), pages 41-60, January.
    2. Kauppi, Heikki & Widgrén, Mika, 2008. "Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room in Explaining EU Budget Receipts?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    6. Heikki Kauppi & Mika Widgrén, 2004. "What determines EU decision making? Needs, power or both?," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 19(39), pages 221-266, July.
    7. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
    8. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
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    13. Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Becker, Sascha O. & Egger, Peter H. & von Ehrlich, Maximilian, 2012. "Too much of a good thing? On the growth effects of the EU's regional policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 648-668.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European integration; Council of Ministers; power;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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