Assessment Of Voting Situations: The Probabilistic Foundations
In this paper we revise the probabilistic foundations of the theory of the measurement of 'voting power' either as success or decisiveness. For an assessment of these features two inputs are claimed to be necessary: the voting procedure and the voters' behavior. We propose a simple model in which the voters' behavior is summarized by a probability distribution over all vote configurations. This basic model, at once simpler and more general that other probabilistic models, provides a clear conceptual common basis to reinterpret coherently from a unified point of view di.erent power indices and some related game theoretic notions, as well as a wider perspective for a dispassionate assessment of the power indices themselves, their merits and their limitations.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2002|
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|Publication status:||Published by Ivie|
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- Emilio Calvo & J. Javier Lasaga, 1997. "Probabilistic Graphs and Power Indices," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 9(4), pages 477-501, October.
- Pradeep Dubey & Abraham Neyman & Robert J. Weber, 1979. "Value Theory without Efficiency," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 513, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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