On The Difficulty Of Making Decisions Within The Eu-25
In this paper we measure the effect of the quota on the difficulty of making decisions in the EU-25 Council after the next enlargement. We compute the probability of a proposal being rejected in the Council. This probability depends on the voting rule (and therefore on the quota) and on the probabilities of the different vote configurations. Here we do not consider that all vote configurations are equiprobable, the classical implicit or explicit assumption. We assume that vote configurations with a minority of members states in favour of the proposal have a null probability, with other vote configurations being equiprobable.
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- Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle, 2002. "Assessment Of Voting Situations: The Probabilistic Foundations," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-22, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Dan S. Felsenthal & MoshÚ Machover, 2004.
"Qualified Majority Voting Explained,"
Institute of SocioEconomics, vol. 21, pages 573-576.
- Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Qualified majority voting explained," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 24230, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)