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The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations

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  • Napel, Stefan
  • Widgrén, Mika

Abstract

The paper analyses the appointment of the European Commission as a strategic game between members of the EU's Council of Ministers and the European Parliament. The focal equilibrium results in Commissioners that duplicate policy preferences of national Council representatives. Different internal decision rules still prevent the Commission from being a Council clone in aggregate. Rather, it is predicted that Commission policies are on average more in accord with the aggregate position of the Parliament than the Council. A data set covering 66 dossiers with 162 controversial EU legislative proposals passed between 1999 and 2002 is investigated to test this. In fact, the Council is significantly more conservative than Parliament and Commission; the latter two are significantly closer to each other than Council and Commission.

Suggested Citation

  • Napel, Stefan & Widgrén, Mika, 2006. "The European Commission - Appointment, Preferences and Institutional Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 5478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5478
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Topan, Angelina, 2002. "The resignation of the Santer-Commission: the impact of 'trust' and 'reputation'," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 6, September.
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    4. Muthoo,Abhinay, 1999. "Bargaining Theory with Applications," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521576475.
    5. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-339, March.
    6. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
    7. Napel,S. & Widgren,M., 2002. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 345, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    8. Franchino, Fabio, 2004. "Delegating Powers in the European Community," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(02), pages 269-293, April.
    9. Dan S Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2004. "Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 23(1), pages 1-20, August.
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    12. Abdul Ghafar Noury & Simon Hix & Gérard Roland, 2003. "How to choose the European executive? A counterfactual analysis, 1979-2001," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8516, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jenny Helstroffer & Marie Obidzinski, 2014. "Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 29-46, August.
    2. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2011. "Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU Council of Ministers: the consultation procedure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 37(3), pages 511-541, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    collective choice; European Commission; European integration; power;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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