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Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game

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  • Jenny Helstroffer

    ()

  • Marie Obidzinski

    ()

Abstract

The European Union’s codecision procedure is analyzed as a bargaining game between the Council and the European Parliament. The model shows that the policy outcome is biased towards the ideal point of the institution that is closest to the status quo, when the negotiation leads to an agreement. If the Council’s ideal policy is closer to the status quo, as is the case for example concerning the duration of maternity leave, the resulting policy will remain closer to the Council’s than to the European Parliament’s position. Furthermore, the result of the codecision procedure is Kaldor–Hicks inefficient. The developments of common policies concerning asylum, fishery and maternity leave illustrate both the possibility of the failure of negotiations and the influence of the Council on the outcome. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Jenny Helstroffer & Marie Obidzinski, 2014. "Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 29-46, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:38:y:2014:i:1:p:29-46
    DOI: 10.1007/s10657-013-9383-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Codecision; European Union; Council of Ministers; European Parliament; Law making; D72; D78; F22; K42; H53;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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