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Reforming the EU Budgetary Procedure: Is Codecision a Step Forward?

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  • Luisa Giuriato

Abstract

Codecision is the main European Union legislative procedure and the 2007 Reform Treaty draft has adopted it to improve the budgetary process. However, at close examination, codecision and the current budgetary process show an identical structure. Both are designed as non-cooperative alternating offers bargaining games between institutions and both, although in different measure, have gone through periods of interinstitutional deadlocks and conflicts, which can be ascribed to the insufficiency of the non-cooperative bargaining setup with respect to the task of providing for joint-decision making by the Parliament and the Council of Ministers: in particular, the opportunistic interpretation of the Treaty provisions by the Parliament in the 1980s was one of the consequences of the strict bargaining design. The article argues that the lacking elements for joint decision making have been gradually inserted in the procedures by means of informal negotiation institutions, which are not only mechanisms for equilibrium selection but also corrective devices to strict non-cooperative procedures. Informal institutions will play a fundamental role also in the change from the current budgetary procedure to the one designed in the 2007 Reform Treaty, where the Parliament does not seem to gain a 'dominant position', the Commission improves its scope for action and the Council consolidates its role. (JEL codes: D73, D78, H77) Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Luisa Giuriato, 2009. "Reforming the EU Budgetary Procedure: Is Codecision a Step Forward?," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 55(1), pages 57-93, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:55:y:2009:i:1:p:57-93
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alesina, Alberto & Hausmann, Ricardo & Hommes, Rudolf & Stein, Ernesto, 1999. "Budget institutions and fiscal performance in Latin America," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 253-273, August.
    2. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2006. "The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(1), pages 129-154, August.
    3. Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, 1994. "The Political Economy of Budget Deficits," NBER Working Papers 4637, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Henrik Enderlein & Johannes Lindner & Oscar Calvo-Gonzalez & Raymond Ritter, 2005. "The EU budget – how much scope for institutional reform?," Public Economics 0509005, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2003. "Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee," CESifo Working Paper Series 1029, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. repec:cup:apsrev:v:88:y:1994:i:01:p:128-142_09 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:wfo:wstudy:47023 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jenny Helstroffer & Marie Obidzinski, 2014. "Codecision procedure biais: the European legislation game," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 29-46, August.
    3. Bas van Aarle, 2013. "Surveillance and Control of Fiscal Consolidation on a Supranational Level," WWWforEurope Working Papers series 46, WWWforEurope.
    4. repec:wfo:wstudy:47021 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Andreas Sachs, 2013. "Governance Structures in Europe," WWWforEurope Deliverables series 2, WWWforEurope.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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