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Do National Numerical Fiscal Rules Really Shape Fiscal Behaviours in Developing Countries? A Treatment Effect Evaluation

  • Rene Tapsoba

    (CERDI - Centre d'études et de recherches sur le developpement international - CNRS : UMR6587 - Université d'Auvergne - Clermont-Ferrand I)

This paper analyses the effect of National Numerical Fiscal Rules (FRs) upon fiscal discipline in 74 developing countries over the period 1990-2007. It is the first study that assesses the impact of FRs on budgetary outcomes while controlling for the self-selection problem. It finds that the effect of FRs on structural fiscal balance is significantly positive, robust to a variety of alternative specifications, and varies with the type of FRs. It also finds that the treatment effect differs according to countries characteristics: number of FRs, time length since FRs adoption, presence of supranational FRs, government fractionalisation and government stability.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number halshs-00667201.

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Date of creation: 07 Feb 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00667201
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