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Voting chances instead of voting weights

  • Di Giannatale, Paolo
  • Passarelli, Francesco

We study political distortions that emerge in situations where agents’ political power is disproportionate with respect to their economic power. We use the Shapley value to evaluate both the economic and the political power. We show that usual weighted majority voting cannot prevent political distortions from emerging in a huge mass of situations. Distortions are less severe if partners can leave the union at low cost.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 65 (2013)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 164-173

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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:65:y:2013:i:3:p:164-173
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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