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Why not proportional?

  • Jean-François Laslier

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

This paper reviews the arguments that justify the principles of proportional and degressively proportional representation.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00625308.

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Date of creation: 21 Sep 2011
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00625308
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00625308/en/
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  1. Gelman, Andrew & Katz, Jonathan N. & Bafumi, Joseph, 2002. "Standard Voting Power Indexes Don't Work: An Empirical Analysis," Working Papers 1133, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Yukio Koriyama & Jean-Fran�ois Laslier & Antonin Mac� & Rafael Treibich, 2013. "Optimal Apportionment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584 - 608.
  3. Lindner, Ines & Machover, Moshe, 2004. "L.S. Penrose's limit theorem: proof of some special cases," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 37-49, January.
  4. Barr, Jason & Passarelli, Francesco, 2009. "Who has the power in the EU?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 339-366, May.
  5. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2006. "On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(2), pages 317-339, April.
  6. Blackorby, Charles & Bossert, Walter & Donaldson, David, 2002. "Utilitarianism and the theory of justice," Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, in: K. J. Arrow & A. K. Sen & K. Suzumura (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 11, pages 543-596 Elsevier.
  7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521873871 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Annick Laruelle & Federico Valenciano, 2005. "Assessing success and decisiveness in voting situations," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 24(1), pages 171-197, January.
  9. Rose, Richard & Bernhagen, Patrick & Borz, Gabriela, 2012. "Evaluating competing criteria for allocating parliamentary seats," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 85-89.
  10. Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann, 2010. "Welfarist evaluations of decision rules under interstate utility dependencies," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 315-344, February.
  11. Macé, Antonin & Treibich, Rafael, 2012. "Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 141-151.
  12. Geoffrey Grimmett & Jean-François Laslier & Friedrich Pukelsheim & Victoriano Ramirez Gonzalez & Richard Rose & Wojciech Slomczynski & Martin Zachariasen & Karol Życzkowski, 2011. "The allocation between the EU member states of the seats in the European Parliament Cambridge Compromise," Working Papers hal-00609946, HAL.
  13. Claus Beisbart & Luc Bovens, 2007. "Welfarist evaluations of decision rules for boards of representatives," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 581-608, December.
  14. M. L. BALINSKI & H. P. young, 1982. "Fair Representation in the European Parliament," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(4), pages 361-373, 06.
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