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A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm–Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy

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  • Wada, Junichiro

Abstract

This paper links Stolarsky mean apportionment methods, which include the US House of Representatives, the Saint-Lague, and the d’Hondt methods, to Kolm–Atkinson social welfare maximization and to generalized entropy minimization. Within this class, the logarithmic mean apportionment method is the most unbiased one that assigns at least one seat to each state.

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  • Wada, Junichiro, 2012. "A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm–Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 243-247.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:63:y:2012:i:3:p:243-247
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.02.002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Junichiro Wada, 2010. "Evaluating the Unfairness of Representation With the Nash Social Welfare Function," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 445-467, October.
    2. Lauwers, Luc & Van Puyenbroeck, Tom, 2008. "Minimally Disproportional Representation: Generalized Entropy and Stolarsky Mean-Divisor Methods of Apportionment," Working Papers 2008/24, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    3. Laslier, Jean-François, 2012. "Why not proportional?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 90-93.
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    Cited by:

    1. Huiru Zhao & Sen Guo & Qi Zhang & Chunjie Li, 2014. "Social Welfare Evaluation of Electric Universal Service in China: From the Perspective of Sustainability," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 6(8), pages 1-17, August.
    2. Junichiro Wada, 2016. "Apportionment Behind the Veil of Uncertainty," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 67(3), pages 348-360, September.
    3. Wada, Junichiro & Kamahara, Yuta, 2018. "Studying malapportionment using α-divergence," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 77-89.
    4. Nicolas Boccard, 2023. "Electoral inequity," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 35(2), pages 100-125, April.

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