Why not proportional?
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Abstract
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DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2011.10.012
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Other versions of this item:
- Laslier, Jean-François, 2012. "Why not proportional?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 90-93.
- Jean-François Laslier, 2011. "Why not proportional?," Working Papers hal-00625308, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
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"Optimal Apportionment,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584-608.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Di Giannatale, Paolo & Passarelli, Francesco, 2013.
"Voting chances instead of voting weights,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 164-173.
- Paolo Di Giannatale, Francesco Passarelli, 2011. "Voting Chances Instead of Voting Weights," ISLA Working Papers 40, ISLA, Centre for research on Latin American Studies and Transition Economies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
- Paolo Di Giannatale & Francesco Passarelli, 2012. "Voting chances instead of voting weights," LIUC Papers in Economics 261, Cattaneo University (LIUC).
- Di Giannatale, Paolo & Passarelli, Francesco, 2012. "Voting chances instead of voting weights," MPRA Paper 43059, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Wada, Junichiro, 2012. "A divisor apportionment method based on the Kolm–Atkinson social welfare function and generalized entropy," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 243-247.
- Casella, Alessandra & Laslier, Jean-François & Macé, Antonin, 2017.
"Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 239-259.
- Alessandra Casella & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2016. "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," AMSE Working Papers 1612, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 11 Mar 2016.
- Alessandra Casella & Jean Francois Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2016. "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," NBER Working Papers 22231, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alessandra Casella & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2017. "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," Post-Print hal-01680728, HAL.
- Casella, Alessandra & Laslier, Jean-Francois & Macé, Antonin, 2016. "Democracy for Polarized Committees. The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," CEPR Discussion Papers 11256, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alessandra Casella & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2016. "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," PSE Working Papers halshs-01287795, HAL.
- Alessandra Casella & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé, 2016. "Democracy for Polarized Committees: The Tale of Blotto's Lieutenants," Working Papers halshs-01287795, HAL.
- Biró, Péter & Kóczy, László Á. & Sziklai, Balázs, 2015.
"Fair apportionment in the view of the Venice Commission’s recommendation,"
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 32-41.
- László Á. Kóczy & Balázs Sziklai & Péter Biró, 2013. "Fair Apportionment in the View of the Venice Commission's Recommendation," Working Paper Series 1302, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.
- Yukio Koriyama & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2013.
"Optimal Apportionment,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(3), pages 584-608.
- Yukio Koriyama & Jean-François Laslier & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2012. "Optimal Apportionment," Working Papers hal-00667852, HAL.
- Yukio Koriyama & Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich & Jean-François Laslier, 2013. "Optimal Apportionment," Post-Print halshs-01321784, HAL.
- Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2018. "Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power," Working Papers halshs-01630090, HAL.
- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017.
"Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral,"
L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
- Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2016. "Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral," TSE Working Papers 16-617, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2016.
- Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Vincent Merlin, 2016. "Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral," Working Papers hal-01452556, HAL.
- Michel Le Breton & Dominique Lepelley & Antonin Macé & Vincent Merlin, 2017. "Le Mécanisme Optimal de Vote au Sein du Conseil des Représentants d'un Système Fédéral," Post-Print hal-01680778, HAL.
- Macé, Antonin & Treibich, Rafael, 2012. "Computing the optimal weights in a utilitarian model of apportionment," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 141-151.
- Allen, Trevor J. & Taagepera, Rein, 2017. "Seat allocation in federal second chambers: Logical models in Canada and Germany," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 22-30.
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Keywords
principles of proportional; principles of degressively;Statistics
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