Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU
In this paper we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players' voting 'yes' for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player's power.We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.
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- Jason Barr & Francesco Passarelli, "undated".
"Who Has the Power in the EU?,"
Working Papers Rutgers University, Newark
2004-005, Department of Economics, Rutgers University, Newark.
- Baldwin, Richard & Widgrén, Mika, 2004. "Winners and Losers Under Various Dual Majority Rules for the EU Council of Ministers," CEPR Discussion Papers 4450, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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