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Voting Power of Citizens in a Democracy

Author

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  • Aakash Gupta

Abstract

Shapley and Shubik in 1954 proposed an index to measure the relative voting power of members of a decision-making body, given their weights in the said body. In this article, we have tried to investigate whether one can ensure equal voting power for all the citizens in a democracy through their respective representatives in the state legislature. The article shows that if the citizens realise their voting power through legislators and the number of constituencies in a democracy are at most four, then there does not exist any weighted voting rule such that the citizens enjoy equal voting power. JEL: C71, D71, D72

Suggested Citation

  • Aakash Gupta, 2025. "Voting Power of Citizens in a Democracy," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 24(2), pages 195-206, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:artjou:v:24:y:2025:i:2:p:195-206
    DOI: 10.1177/09767479231164815
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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