Proportional versus winner-take-all electoral vote allocations
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9660-3
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Cited by:
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2019. "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," ISER Discussion Paper 1059, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2019.
"The Winner-Take-All Dilemma,"
ISER Discussion Paper
1059r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Dec 2019.
- Kazuya Kikuchi & Yukio Koriyama, 2022. "The Winner-Take-All Dilemma," Papers 2206.09574, arXiv.org.
- Konstantinos Matakos & Dimitrios Xefteris, 2015. "Strategic electoral rule choice under uncertainty," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 329-350, March.
- Nicholas Miller, 2012. "Why the Electoral College is good for political science (and public choice)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 1-25, January.
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Keywords
Electoral college; Proportional allocation; Winner-take-all; Weighted voting;All these keywords.
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