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A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment

Author

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  • Eric Guerci

    ()

  • Nobuyuki Hanaki

    ()

  • Naoki Watanabe

    ()

  • Gabriele Esposito

    ()

  • Xiaoyan Lu

    ()

Abstract

We conducted a sensitivity analysis of the results of weighted voting experiments by varying two features of the experimental protocol by Montero et al. (Soc Choice Welf 30(1):69–87, 2008 ): (1) the way in which the roles of subjects are reassigned in each round [random role (RR) vs. fixed role (FR)] and (2) the number of proposals that subjects can simultaneously approve [multiple approval (MA) vs. single approval (SA)]. It was observed that the differences in these protocols had impacts on the relative frequencies of minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) as well as how negotiations proceed. 3-player MWCs were more frequently observed, negotiations were much longer, subjects made less mistakes, and proposal-objection dynamics were more frequently observed, under the protocol with FR and SA than under the protocol with RR and MA. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Guerci & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe & Gabriele Esposito & Xiaoyan Lu, 2014. "A methodological note on a weighted voting experiment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 827-850, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:43:y:2014:i:4:p:827-850
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0814-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Kagel & Hankyoung Sung & Eyal Winter, 2010. "Veto power in committees: an experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(2), pages 167-188, June.
    2. repec:cup:apsrev:v:83:y:1989:i:04:p:1181-1206_08 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Eric Guerci & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe, 2017. "Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 131-153, June.
    4. Maria Montero & Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2008. "Enlargement and the balance of power: an experimental study," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(1), pages 69-87, January.
    5. Edward Packel & John Deegan, 1980. "An axiomated family of power indices for simple n-person games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(2), pages 229-239, January.
    6. Michalis Drouvelis & Maria Montero & Martin Sefton, 2007. "The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence," Discussion Papers 2007-06, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    7. Frechette, Guillaume R. & Kagel, John H. & Morelli, Massimo, 2005. "Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 365-390, May.
    8. repec:cup:apsrev:v:93:y:1999:i:04:p:809-820_21 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Guerci & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe, 2015. "Meaningful Learning in Weighted Voting Games: An Experiment," Working Papers halshs-01216244, HAL.
    2. Eric Guerci & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Naoki Watanabe, 2017. "Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 83(1), pages 131-153, June.

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