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Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules

Author

Listed:
  • Dominique Lepelley

    (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion)

  • Hatem Smaoui

    (CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion)

Abstract

We compare in this paper two classes of sequential scoring rules: the first class eliminates at each step the candidate with the lowest score whereas the second one eliminates the candidates whose scores are equal to or lower than the average score of the candidates remaining in contention. We show that, in three-candidate elections, the second method is susceptible to improve the ability of the sequential scoring rules to avoid monotonicity paradoxes, but this benefit is offset by a decrease in the Condorcet efficiency of these rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Dominique Lepelley & Hatem Smaoui, 2019. "Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules," Post-Print hal-03544910, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03544910
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09618-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2019. "Condorcet efficiency of general weighted scoring rules under IAC: indifference and abstention," Working Papers hal-02196387, HAL.
    2. Felix Brandt & Chris Dong & Dominik Peters, 2024. "Condorcet-Consistent Choice Among Three Candidates," Papers 2411.19857, arXiv.org.
    3. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2021. "Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 55-73, Springer.
    4. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou, 2022. "Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 75-103, April.

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