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Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems

In: Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models

Author

Listed:
  • Eric Kamwa

    (Université des Antilles, Faculté de Droit et d’Economie de la Martinique)

  • Issofa Moyouwou

    (University of Yaounde I)

Abstract

A voting rule is said to be vulnerable to the truncation paradox if some voters may seek to bring about a more preferable outcome by listing only a part of their sincere rankings on the competing candidates rather than listing their entire preference rankings on all the competing candidates. For three-candidate elections and for large electorates, under the Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption (IAC), this chapter provides an evaluation of the likelihood of the truncation paradox occurring for the whole family of scoring rules and runoff scoring rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou, 2021. "Susceptibility to Manipulation by Sincere Truncation: The Case of Scoring Rules and Scoring Runoff Systems," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 275-295, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_12
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_12
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    Cited by:

    1. Diss, Mostapha & Tsvelikhovskiy, Boris, 2021. "Manipulable outcomes within the class of scoring voting rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 11-18.
    2. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Issofa Moyouwou & Hatem Smaoui, 2021. "Condorcet Efficiency of General Weighted Scoring Rules Under IAC: Indifference and Abstention," Studies in Choice and Welfare, in: Mostapha Diss & Vincent Merlin (ed.), Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, pages 55-73, Springer.
    3. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring rules, ballot truncation, and the truncation paradox," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 79-97, July.
    4. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On two voting systems that combine approval and preferences: fallback voting and preference approval voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 169-205, July.
    5. Mostapha Diss & Eric Kamwa & Abdelmonaim Tlidi, 2025. "The effect of close elections on the likelihood of voting paradoxes: Further results in three-candidate elections," Post-Print hal-04230359, HAL.
    6. Eric Kamwa, 2022. "Scoring Rules, Ballot Truncation, and the Truncation Paradox," Working Papers hal-03632662, HAL.
    7. Eric Kamwa, 2023. "On Two Voting systems that combine approval and preferences: Fallback Voting and Preference Approval Voting," Working Papers hal-03614585, HAL.
    8. Sylvain Béal & Marc Deschamps & Mostapha Diss & Issofa Moyouwou, 2022. "Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 75-103, April.
    9. Eric Kamwa, 2021. "To what extent does the model of processing sincereincomplete rankings affect the likelihood of the truncation paradox?," Working Papers hal-02879390, HAL.

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