The Proportional Lottery Protocol is Strongly Participatory and VNM-Strategy-Proof
A voting protocol is said to be strongly participatory if for any player i and any strategy profile either the outcome is i‘s preferred one or has a strategy which would ensure her a better outcome, and VNMstrategy proof if at any preference profile the set of sincere strategies of each player is a VNM-stable set. It is shown that the proportional lottery (PL) modular voting protocol is both strongly participatory and VNMstrategy proof.
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- Joaqui´n Pérez, 2001. "The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 18(3), pages 601-616.
- Moulin, Herve, 1988. "Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 53-64, June.
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