A Borda Measure for Social Choice Functions
The question addressed in this paper is the order of magnitude of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function. In this paper, a simple measure of the difference between the Borda rule and any given social choice function is proposed. It is given by the ratio of the best Borda score achieved by the social choice function under scrutiny over the Borda score of a Borda winner. More precisely, it is the minimum of this ratio over all possible profiles of preferences that is used. This "Borda measure" or at least bounds for this measure is also computed for well known social choice functions.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||1996|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: UNIVERSITE LAVAL, GREPE DEPARTEMENT D'ECONOMIQUE, QUEBEC G1K 7P4.|
Phone: (418) 656-5122
Fax: (418) 656-2707
Web page: http://www.ecn.ulaval.ca/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
- Paul B. Simpson, 1969. "On Defining Areas of Voter Choice: Professor Tullock on Stable Voting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(3), pages 478-490.
- Young, H. P., 1974. "An axiomatization of Borda's rule," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 43-52, September.
- Jonathan Levin & Barry Nalebuff, 1995. "An Introduction to Vote-Counting Schemes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 3-26, Winter.
- Peyton Young, 1995. "Optimal Voting Rules," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 51-64, Winter.
- Saari, Donald G., 1989. "A dictionary for voting paradoxes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 443-475, August.
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
- I. Good, 1971. "A note on condorcet sets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 97-101, March.