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Measurement of consensus with a reference

Author

Listed:
  • José Carlos R., Alcantud
  • Rocío, de Andrés
  • José Manuel, Cascón

Abstract

In this work we contribute to the formal analysis of the measurement of consensus in a society. Instead of approaching the topic from an absolute perspective we are concerned with a practical application: the proposal of a decision mechanism with respect to which consensus is measured. Surprisingly this produces a powerful unifying model, a restriction of which is deeply analysed. We also study the axiomatic properties of particular expressions for consensus with various salient social rules as a reference.

Suggested Citation

  • José Carlos R., Alcantud & Rocío, de Andrés & José Manuel, Cascón, 2011. "Measurement of consensus with a reference," MPRA Paper 32155, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:32155
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Geoffrey Pritchard & Mark Wilson, 2007. "Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 29(3), pages 487-513, October.
    2. Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
    3. Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2016. "Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 80(2), pages 313-339, February.
    4. Vincent R. Merlin & Donald G. Saari, "undated". "The Copeland Method I; Relationships and the Dictionary," Discussion Papers 1111, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    5. Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin, 1996. "The Copeland method (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(1), pages 51-76.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Consensus; coherence; measurement; Borda rule; Copeland rule;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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