Measurement of consensus with a reference
In this work we contribute to the formal analysis of the measurement of consensus in a society. Instead of approaching the topic from an absolute perspective we are concerned with a practical application: the proposal of a decision mechanism with respect to which consensus is measured. Surprisingly this produces a powerful unifying model, a restriction of which is deeply analysed. We also study the axiomatic properties of particular expressions for consensus with various salient social rules as a reference.
|Date of creation:||11 Jul 2011|
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- Geoffrey Pritchard & Mark Wilson, 2007. "Exact results on manipulability of positional voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 487-513, October.
- Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin, 1996. "The Copeland method (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 51-76.
- Jorge Alcalde-Unzu & Marc Vorsatz, 2010. "Do we agree? Measuring the cohesiveness of preferences," Working Papers 2010-23, FEDEA.
- Saari, Donald G, 1990. " Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
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