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Judge:Don't Vote!

Author

Listed:
  • Michel Balinski

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Rida Laraki

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - Polytechnique - X - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that best meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2010. "Judge:Don't Vote!," Working Papers hal-00536968, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00536968 Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00536968
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    File URL: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00536968/document
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2007. "Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence," Working Papers hal-00243076, HAL.
    2. Hammond, Peter J, 1976. "Equity, Arrow's Conditions, and Rawls' Difference Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(4), pages 793-804, July.
    3. Balinski, Michel & Jennings, Andrew & Laraki, Rida, 2009. "Monotonic incompatibility between electing and ranking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 145-147, November.
    4. Eric Zitzewitz, 2006. "Nationalism in Winter Sports Judging and Its Lessons for Organizational Decision Making," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(1), pages 67-99, March.
    5. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arrow's paradox; Condorcet's paradox; Majority judgment; Skating; Social choice; Strategic manipulation; Voting; Paradoxe d'Arrow; Paradoxe de Condorcet; Patinage artistique; Choix social; Jugement majoritaire; Manipulation stratégique; Vote;

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