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Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule

Author

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  • Michel Balinski

    (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, X - École polytechnique)

  • Rida Laraki

    (Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres, LAMSADE - Laboratoire d'analyse et modélisation de systèmes pour l'aide à la décision - Université Paris Dauphine-PSL - PSL - Université Paris sciences et lettres - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, X - École polytechnique)

Abstract

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2016. "Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule," Working Papers hal-01304043, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01304043
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-01304043
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Justin Kruger & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 535-555, October.
    2. Adrien Fabre, 2021. "Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 56(1), pages 101-124, January.
    3. Rida Laraki, 2023. "Electoral reform: the case for majority judgment," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 346-356, September.
    4. García-Lapresta, José Luis & Marques Pereira, Ricardo Alberto, 2022. "An extension of Majority Judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 301(2), pages 667-674.
    5. Burka, Dávid & Puppe, Clemens & Szepesváry, László & Tasnádi, Attila, 2022. "Voting: A machine learning approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 299(3), pages 1003-1017.
    6. Ruffin-Benoît M. Ngoie & Eric Kamwa & Berthold Ulungu, 2018. "Joint use of the mean and median for multi criteria decision support: the 3MCD method," Working Papers hal-01760775, HAL.
    7. Stefano Vannucci, 2019. "Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 48(3), pages 863-886, September.
    8. Aubin, Jean-Baptiste & Gannaz, Irène & Leoni, Samuela & Rolland, Antoine, 2022. "Deepest voting: A new way of electing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 1-16.
    9. Rida Laraki & Estelle Varloot, 2021. "Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms," Papers 2108.04705, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
    10. Manzoor Ahmad Zahid & Harrie de Swart, 2015. "Experimental Results about Linguistic Voting," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 9(3), pages 184-201, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    measuring; ranking; electing; majority rule; Condorcet consistency; tyranny of majority; intensity problem; majority-gauge; strategy-proofness; polarization;
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