A nail-biting election
In the first competitive election for President of the Social Choice and Welfare Society, the (official) approval-voting winner differed from the (hypothetical) Borda count winner, who was also the Condorcet winner. But because the election was essentially a toss-up, it is impossible to say who should have won. The election for Council was more true to form of other professional-society elections, with the winners identical, and even their rankings almost duplicative, under both voting systems.
Volume (Year): 18 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
|Note:||Received: 11 April 2000/Accepted: 26 March 2001|
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- Michel Regenwetter & Bernard Grofman, 1998. "Approval Voting, Borda Winners, and Condorcet Winners: Evidence from Seven Elections," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 44(4), pages 520-533, April.
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