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Deepest voting: A new way of electing

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  • Aubin, Jean-Baptiste
  • Gannaz, Irène
  • Leoni, Samuela
  • Rolland, Antoine

Abstract

This article aims to present a unified framework for grading-based voting processes. The idea is to represent the grades of each voter on d candidates as a point in Rd and to define the winner of the vote using the deepest point of the scatter plot. The deepest point is obtained by the maximization of a depth function. Universality, unanimity, and neutrality properties are proved to be satisfied. Monotonicity and IIA are also studied. It is shown that usual voting processes correspond to specific choices of depth functions. Finally, some basic paradoxes are explored for these voting processes.

Suggested Citation

  • Aubin, Jean-Baptiste & Gannaz, Irène & Leoni, Samuela & Rolland, Antoine, 2022. "Deepest voting: A new way of electing," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 1-16.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:116:y:2022:i:c:p:1-16
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.12.006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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