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Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking

  • Michel Balinski

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

  • Andrew Jennings

    (Department of Mathematics and Statistics - Arizona State University)

  • Rida Laraki

    (Department of Economics, Ecole Polytechnique - CNRS : UMR7176 - Polytechnique - X)

Borda a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des m candidats. Condorcet a proposé une méthode qui attribue des points à chacun des différents m! classements des candidats. La première est plus appropriée pour élire. La seconde est plus appropriée pour classer. Chacune satisfait une certaine monotonie. Leurs monotonies sont incompatibles

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Paper provided by HAL in its series Working Papers with number hal-00339030.

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Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00339030
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00339030/en/
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  1. Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
  2. Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
  3. Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
  4. Eric Maskin, 1998. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1829, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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