Monotonic Incompatibility Between Electing and Ranking
Borda proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m candidates. Condorcet proposed a method that assigns points to each of the m! rankings of candidates. The first is more appropriate for electing, the second is more appropriate for ranking. Each satisfies a different type of monotonicity. These monotonicities are incompatible.
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- Smith, John H, 1973. "Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(6), pages 1027-41, November.
- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki, 2006. "A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking," Working Papers hal-00243040, HAL.
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
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