Nash implementable domains for the Borda count
We characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity. The basic concept is the notion of a "cyclic permutation domain" which arises by fixing one particular ordering of alternatives and including all its cyclic permutations. The cyclic permutation domains are exactly the maximal domains on which the Borda count is strategy-proof (when combined with every tie breaking rule). It turns out that the Borda count is monotonic on a larger class of domains. We show that the maximal domains on which the Borda count satisfies Maskin monotonicity are the "cyclically nested permutation domains." These are the preference domains which can be obtained from the cyclic permutation domains in an appropriate recursive way.
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Volume (Year): 31 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
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References listed on IDEAS
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