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Condorcet Consistency And Pairwise Justifiability Under Variable Agendas

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  • Salvador Barberà
  • Dolors Berga
  • Bernardo Moreno
  • Antonio Nicolò

Abstract

We compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to anonymous and neutral rules defined over a class of domains. The class contains the universal, the single‐peaked, and that of order restriction, among other preference domains.

Suggested Citation

  • Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno & Antonio Nicolò, 2025. "Condorcet Consistency And Pairwise Justifiability Under Variable Agendas," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 66(1), pages 313-329, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:iecrev:v:66:y:2025:i:1:p:313-329
    DOI: 10.1111/iere.12728
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    References listed on IDEAS

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