Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity
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Volume (Year): 27 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (August)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Eric Maskin, 1999. "Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38.
- ASWAL, Navin & CHATTERJI, Shurojit & SEN, Arunava, 1999.
CORE Discussion Papers
1999040, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Muller, Eitan & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1977. "The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 412-418, April.
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